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INTRODUCTION
The role of empirical research in family law has long been contested.
On the one hand, empirical data, particularly when systematically collected
by courts and public agencies, can create a shared foundation for policy
debates.1  On the other hand, reliance on empirical research to address com-
plex normative questions is deeply controversial.2  An important reason is
that empirical research can rarely untangle multicausal developments taking
place across numerous jurisdictions over an extended period of time.3  It is
difficult to establish convincingly, for example, whether women’s workforce
participation increased the demand for divorce reform or whether the legal
© 2020 June Carbone.  Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and
distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for educational purposes, so
long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review,
and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Robina Chair of Law, Science and Technology, University of Minnesota Law
School.  I would like to thank Naomi Cahn for her comments on an earlier draft of this
Article and Grace O’Meara for her research assistance.
1 See, e.g., Clare Huntington, Essay, The Empirical Turn in Family Law, 118 COLUM. L.
REV. 227, 304–05 (2018).
2 See id. at 241–49 (marriage equality), 250–252 (abortion), 304 (childhood poverty).
3 See Margaret F. Brinig, Empirical Work in Family Law, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1083,
1084–94 (describing limitations of empirical work in family law and risks of overstating the
impact of law on behavior).
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changes in divorce grounds encouraged women to stay in the workforce, par-
ticularly when the causal arrows may run in both directions.4  A second rea-
son is that intensely fought normative issues tend to produce motivated
research and motivated interpretation of that research.5  The empirical liter-
ature on LGBT parenting, for example, grew along with same-sex couples’
struggle for recognition and the opposition to such claims.6  The motivations
behind some of the studies make them easy to dismiss.7  A third reason is that
many scholars and policymakers are reluctant to treat fundamental values
questions, such as whether abortion should be legal or unmarried fathers
should have a right to see their children, as dependent on empirical find-
ings.8  The fact that empirical studies cannot show that the unmarried fathers
have a positive impact on their children, for example, does not necessarily
answer the question of whether the fathers should be more involved.9
This Article, in considering the role of empirical research in family law,
seeks to recast the debate about the utility of such research.  The Article
maintains that empirical research, standing on its own, cannot and should
not be used to resolve the broader legal and policy issues in family law.
Instead, it should be seen as an important tool in furthering the ongoing
discourses about those issues.  And, thus, the value of empirical tools
depends on carefully considering the nature of the discourses in which the
tools are embedded.
In considering family law discourses, this Article relies on Jürgen
Habermas’s use of the term “discourse” to describe exchanges that involve “a
cooperative search for truth,”10 where “[e]ach person aims to persuade in
good faith rather than seeking to threaten, trick, or bribe; each participant
takes account of the others’ interests and needs, and modifies her own
4 See Margaret F. Brinig, The Role of Socioeconomics in Teaching Family Law, 41 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 177, 181 (2004) (observing that the increase in women’s workforce partici-
pation began before the legal changes and continued to increase thereafter).
5 For a discussion of the role of motivated reasoning in the use of research, see Dan
M. Kahan, Foreword: Neutral Principles, Motivated Cognition, and Some Problems for Constitu-
tional Law, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1, 7 (2011) (stating that “[m]otivated reasoning refers to the
tendency of people to unconsciously process information—including empirical data, oral
and written arguments, and even their own brute sensory perceptions—to promote goals
or interests extrinsic to the decisionmaking task at hand”).
6 Huntington, supra note 1, at 241–49.
7 See id. at 270 (describing rejection of unsupported studies); see also Brinig, supra
note 3, at 1094–95 (describing the tension between “voice” and “bias” as many of those
conducting empirical studies may have a stake in the outcomes, such as fathers conducting
custody studies who have litigated custody issues in their own divorces).
8 Huntington, supra note 1, at 233 (arguing that “focusing on child well-being ignores
the other value-based reasons for protecting father-child relationships, including gender
equality and fathers’ liberty interests in the relationship”).
9 Id.
10 Jonathan Weinberg, The Right to Be Taken Seriously, 67 U. MIAMI L. REV. 149, 170
(2012) (quoting JÜRGEN HABERMAS, MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND COMMUNICATIVE ACTION
198 (Christian Lenhardt & Shierry Weber Nicholsen trans., 1990)).
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accordingly.”11  Family law discourses, thought of in terms of a “cooperative
search for truth,” can be framed narrowly or broadly and empirical research,
when it is most useful, contributes not just to resolving the questions as the
core of the discourse, but in reframing the discourse itself.  For that to hap-
pen, empirical work has to become part of an exchange, rather than a given
supplying fixed answers to set questions.  This requires recognizing that how
a given discourse is initially framed often determines the structure of the
empirical work that is undertaken, and that the best empirical work often
produces results that should call that framing into question.  Empirical work
becomes most valuable when that iterative process is recognized and used to
further the inquiry.12
Consider, for example, empirical studies that show that systematic use of
voluntary acknowledgments of paternity (VAPs) to establish legal parenthood
at the time of a child’s birth make it easier to secure child support orders.13
Add the implications of other research that demonstrates that state-initiated
child support enforcement produces counterproductive effects, reducing
poor fathers’ overall material contributions to and involvement with their
children.14  The role of the empirical research may then depend on the pur-
pose of the inquiry.  For example, policymakers may assume that it is benefi-
cial to public policy objectives to increase the support children receive from
parents, and their inquiry may be narrowly focused on the question: What
legal changes best facilitate increased child support enforcement?  Within
such an exchange, empirical work could establish that VAPs facilitate child
support enforcement and might suggest that the VAPs would be even more
effective if child support orders were entered shortly after birth.  Alterna-
tively, however, the additional studies suggesting that child support enforce-
ment is counterproductive might serve to prompt reconsideration of the
nature of the inquiry.  Perhaps the focus of the inquiry should shift from how
to use child support enforcement to collect the largest amount of money to
how to increase children’s well-being, taking into account a mix of private
and public, material and emotional support.  The empirical research could
thus contribute to a redefinition of the discourse.  The empirical questions
asked and the structure of the research undertaken to answer them would
then shift with the change in the purpose of the inquiry.
The ability of empirical research to play such a role, however, requires a
fertile environment for such exchanges, and it is arguable that for many of
the most important family law questions of our time, that environment does
11 Jonathan Weinberg, Bureaucracy as Violence, 115 MICH. L. REV. 1097, 1111 (2017)
(book review).
12 See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, From Contract to Status: Collaboration and
the Evolution of Novel Family Relationships, 115 COLUM L. REV. 293, 340 (2015) (describing
norm creation as an “iterative process”).
13 See, e.g., Clare Huntington, Postmarital Family Law: A Legal Structure for Nonmarital
Families, 67 STAN. L. REV. 167, 205–09 (2015) (discussing child support laws).
14 See, e.g., Leslie Joan Harris, Questioning Child Support Enforcement Policy for Poor Fami-
lies, 45 FAM. L.Q. 157, 165–66 (2011).
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not exist.15  Nonetheless, there should be room for such exchanges in the
central academic inquiries that underlie family law.  These debates involve
identifying the changing nature of the family, understanding the causes and
consequences of the changes, examining the role of the law in influencing
family decisionmaking, and considering the implications for legal and public
policy.  Empirical discourses sometimes address these foundational issues;
yet, over the course of the last several decades, empirical work has had its
greatest impact either on narrowly defined questions16 or within siloed
discussions.17
This has been true in part because of the lack of a more robust exchange
about the nature of the discourses on family change.  Instead, there have
been two dominant models within the social sciences, both rejected by many
legal scholars,18 but still influential in shaping empirical research.  The first
is Gary Becker’s A Treatise on the Family.19  Becker, who won the Nobel Prize
in Economics for his work extending economics outsides of the narrow con-
fines of commercial behavior, posited that marriage involves a trade between
male “specialization” in the market and female “specialization” in the house-
hold.  Within this model, women’s workforce participation constitutes a loss
of specialization, lowering the gains from marriage, and thereby contributing
to higher divorce and nonmarital birth rates.  While economists routinely
observe that many of Becker’s predictions have proved spectacularly wrong,20
no other model has taken its place as a fundamental theory explaining family
dynamics.  Economist Robert Pollak explained the result: “Like all social
scientists who study the family, I must position myself in relation to Gary
15 See, e.g., Huntington, supra note 1, at 241–50 (identifying issues such as marriage
equality and abortion as such discourses).
16 The broad consensus that family violence negatively affects children is an example.
See id. at 241 (discussing child abuse); Lois A. Weithorn, Protecting Children from Exposure to
Domestic Violence: The Use and Abuse of Child Maltreatment Statutes, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 4–6
(2001) (observing that “[i]n the past two decades, researchers have amassed an impressive
body of empirical data demonstrating the negative impact of exposure to domestic vio-
lence upon children’s psychological development and functioning”).
17 The role of empirical inquiry in the abortion debate, for example, has often been
channeled into limited inquiries.  Compare Huntington’s discussion of the empirical evi-
dence supporting the Supreme Court decision on later term abortions, Huntington, supra
note 1, at 251, with the empirical studies on welfare reform, see, e.g., Rebekah J. Smith,
Family Caps in Welfare Reform: Their Coercive Effects and Damaging Consequences, 29 HARV. J.L.
& GENDER 151, 176–79 (2006) (discussing the relatively few studies on abortion, the role of
the Guttmacher Institute as the major source of data on abortion, and the relatively few
studies examining the relationship between family caps on welfare benefits and abortion).
18 See, e.g., FEMINISM CONFRONTS HOMO ECONOMICUS: GENDER, LAW, AND SOCIETY
(Martha Albertson Fineman & Terence Dougherty eds., 2005) [hereinafter FEMINISM CON-
FRONTS HOMO ECONOMICUS] (particularly Part V).
19 GARY S. BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY 31 (1981) (postulating theorems show-
ing the relationship between specialization and increasing returns to scale).
20 See, e.g., Betsey Stevenson & Justin Wolfers, Marriage and Divorce: Changes and Their
Driving Forces, 21 J. ECON. PERSP. 27, 43 (2007) (noting the inaccuracy of Becker’s assertion
that the higher-earning men would want to marry lower-earning women).
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Becker.  To a remarkable extent, his vision has shaped the tools we use, the
questions we ask, and the answers we give.”21  And, indeed, in 2019, an inno-
vative study of the impact of men’s declining workforce opportunities on
family stability continued to interpret its findings through the lens of
Becker’s notions of household specialization.22
Within sociology and demography, a second framing discourse has
arisen, termed “the second demographic transition” (SDT).  The SDT
predicts “sustained subreplacement fertility, a multitude of living arrange-
ments other than marriage, [and] the disconnection between marriage and
procreation.”23  It describes the “primary driver of these trends” as a “cultural
shift toward postmodern attitudes and norms (i.e., those stressing individual-
ity and self-actualization).”24  Like Becker’s economic theories, this work has
been successful in creating an influential discourse on the family and family
change.  Moreover, this discourse starts with empirical assertions: the descrip-
tions of declining fertility and greater family variety.25  Yet, as with Becker’s
theories, critics have claimed that the SDT theories do not completely fit the
empirical findings, particularly with respect to their causal claim that expres-
sive individualism is the driving factor behind the demographic transitions.26
American family law has begun to reference SDT theories.  In Inside the Castle,
for example, Joanna Grossman and Lawrence Friedman provide a history of
twentieth-century changes in marriage and divorce.  Influenced by sociolo-
gists like Andrew Cherlin, they describe a major shift to “expressive mar-
riage,” in which “[h]usband and wife were looking for personal fulfillment;
they evaluated their marriage ‘in terms of self-development, as opposed to
the satisfaction they gained through pleasing their spouse and raising their
children.’”27  The result is a more sophisticated examination of the interac-
tions between societal change and legal reform than the Becker-style eco-
nomic analyses would suggest.28  Yet, the book, by focusing exclusively on
21 Robert A. Pollak, Gary Becker’s Contributions to Family and Household Economics, 1 REV.
ECON. HOUSEHOLD 111, 111 (2003).
22 David Autor et al., When Work Disappears: Manufacturing Decline and the Falling Mar-
riage Market Value of Young Men, 1 AM. ECON. REV. 161, 163 (2019) (observing that “a fall in
the relative economic stature of men diminishes the gains from household specialization
and therefore reduces the prevalence of marriage” (emphasis omitted)).
23 Batool Zaidi & S. Philip Morgan, The Second Demographic Transition Theory: A Review
and Appraisal, 43 ANN. REV. SOC. 473, 474 (2017) (quoting Ron Lesthaeghe, The Unfolding
Story of the Second Demographic Transition, 36 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 211, 211 (2010)).
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 483 (observing that the claim that the undergirding mechanism is “a shift
from materialism to postmaterialism (or the related child-king to king-couple)” is “prob-
lematic because consistent empirical evidence is lacking” (citations omitted)).
27 JOANNA L. GROSSMAN & LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, INSIDE THE CASTLE: LAW AND THE
FAMILY IN 20TH CENTURY AMERICA 58 (2011) (emphasis omitted) (quoting ANDREW J. CHER-
LIN, THE MARRIAGE-GO-ROUND: THE STATE OF MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY IN AMERICA TODAY
88 (2009)).
28 Id. at 13–16, 176–80 (describing how the rise of companionate marriage fueled the
demand for no-fault divorce).
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what the authors acknowledge is “middle-class family law,”29 misses some of
the tensions that concern the demographers.  It does not consider, for exam-
ple, why the SDT has led to increased class division, with divorce rates simul-
taneously declining for prosperous families and rising for poorer ones.30
And as Kerry Abrams suggests, this leaves room for further consideration of
how “not only . . . society shapes law but . . . law creates a feedback loop that
further reconstructs society.”31  Boring more deeply into these issues requires
a richer dialogue between those who assemble the data, those who frame the
empirical research questions, and those who apply it to the legal and policy
issues that shape family law.
This Article will consider the framework for empirical work on family
law, arguing that the failure to ask more sophisticated questions at the begin-
ning of the research has limited its effectiveness.  In this sense, Professor Peg
Brinig’s work stands out for the creativity of the questions she has asked, her
exploration of underutilized databases, and her work’s potential to serve as a
foundation for a new paradigm for the integration of empirical work into
family law theory.
This Article will discuss the way that theory—and the creation of dis-
courses associated with it—informs empirical research.  First, it will maintain
that the influence of empirical work depends on the discourse in which it is
embedded.  Second, it considers the influence of Becker’s paradigm on legal
and economic empirical research, reviewing the ways that Becker’s influence
has diverted much of the empirical work away from more productive inquir-
ies.  In particular, it will suggest that Becker’s insistence on a narrow focus on
“specialization” between men and women misses the much more productive
work that looks at specialization among men in the nineteenth century, spe-
cialization among women in the late twentieth century, and investment in
children’s human capital as the driver of these trends.  Third, it will explore
the alternative sociological frames, which premise family change on cultural
shifts, discounting the wholesale and multifaceted economic changes that
contribute to the cultural shifts.  In particular, this section will suggest that
this literature misses the complex interaction between economics and cul-
ture in large part because growing inequality makes it impossible to discuss
“culture” as a unified concept remaking family practices.  The last section will
provide a “consumer guide” to empirical family law research, identifying the
missing pieces necessary to create more robust discourses connecting family
change to family law and policy.  This Article will conclude that class divisions
along with racial and regional considerations constitute a critical lens for
empirical research and that Professor Brinig’s work offers a foundation for
29 Id. at 2.
30 See KAY HYMOWITZ ET AL., KNOT YET: THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF DELAYED MARRIAGE
IN AMERICA 8 (describing increasing class differences in family form); Sara McLanahan,
Diverging Destinies: How Children Are Faring Under the Second Demographic Transition, 41
DEMOGRAPHY 607, 608, 617 (2004).
31 Kerry Abrams, Family History: Inside and Out, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1001, 1020 (2013)
(reviewing GROSSMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 27).
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alternative explorations of the interactions between family law and family
dynamics.
I. EMPIRICAL STUDIES AND FAMILY LAW DISCOURSE
Empirical work in family law became increasingly important as the fam-
ily changed over the second half of the twentieth century.  Simply establish-
ing what happened became an issue of major concern as divorce rates soared
and then leveled off, nonmarital births rose to forty percent of the total, and
class-based divisions in family forms increased dramatically.32  The larger pro-
ject, however, involved the question of why these changes occurred and how
to make sense of the new, more varied families that emerged.  The question
of why the changes occurred is as much an empirical question as what the
changes were, but it is a much more complex and multifaceted one.33  And
for legal scholars, the reason for the changes is ultimately tied up in the nor-
mative issues of how to respond to the changes.  This has made the construc-
tion of family law discourses perilous because they tie inflammatory issues
involving sex, race, and gender to controversial ideological issues about law
and policy.
The creation of a robust discourse about the family has thus long been a
perilous enterprise.  Daniel Patrick Moynihan’s effort to call attention to the
changing African American family in the sixties effectively shut down the dis-
cussion of race and family life for at least a generation.34  In the interim, a
voluminous empirical literature debated the relationship between the expan-
sion of welfare benefits and changing family form, laying the foundation for
the abolition of the Aid for Dependent Families program in the nineties.35
The discussion about the role of public benefits inspired a spirited legal dis-
cussion of the “dual system of family law,”36 but one that largely remained
32 See generally JUNE CARBONE & NAOMI CAHN, MARRIAGE MARKETS: HOW INEQUALITY IS
REMAKING THE AMERICAN FAMILY (2014) (describing increasing class differences in family
formation and understandings); HYMOWITZ ET AL., supra note 30, at 8 fig.II; McLanahan,
supra note 30, at 607–08, 617 (describing divergences in divorce rates and family income).
33 See, e.g., Brinig, supra note 3, at 1086 (observing that “[a]nother facet of family study
that distinguishes it from other areas (and makes family law either fascinating or discourag-
ing for students) is its complexity”).
34 See, e.g., Linda M. Burton & M. Belinda Tucker, Romantic Unions in an Era of Uncer-
tainty: A Post-Moynihan Perspective on African American Women and Marriage, 621 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 132, 135 (2009) (continuing to object to Moynihan’s perceived
criticism of African American women).
35 For a summary of these developments, see CARBONE & CAHN, supra note 32, at
29–31 (observing that over half of the American public still believes that the expansion of
welfare benefits caused the changes in the family).
36 See generally Jacobus tenBroek, California’s Dual System of Family Law: Its Origin, Devel-
opment, and Present Status (pts. 1–3), 16 STAN. L. REV. 257, 900 (1964), 17 STAN. L. REV. 614
(1965); Tonya L. Brito, The Welfarization of Family Law, 48 U. KAN. L. REV. 229, 238–50
(2000); Naomi R. Cahn, Children’s Interests in a Familial Context: Poverty, Foster Care, and
Adoption, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1189, 1211–15 (1999); Deborah Harris, Child Support for Welfare
Families: Family Policy Trapped in Its Own Rhetoric, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 619,
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orthogonal to empirical questions about the interactions between state aid
and family form.37
A more robust debate about changes in the African American family
took place only when African American scholars began to lead it, and even
then other scholars were slow to apply the lessons to the family more gener-
ally.38  Yet, a retrospective on the Moynihan report in 2009 concluded that
the lessons should have been ones of general applicability, observing that
“Moynihan’s core argument was really rather simple: whenever males in any
population subgroup lack widespread access to reliable jobs, decent earnings,
and key forms of socially rewarded status, single parenthood will increase,
with negative side effects on women and children.”39
Ta-Nehisi Coates nonetheless wrote in 2013 that no Moynihan report
could exist today, not because it is impossible to discuss the relationship
between race and the family, but because there is no audience, liberal or
conservative, for Moynihan’s proposal that the government can and should
do something about it.40
In the meantime, the more general discussions of family decline have
tended to focus on women’s changing roles, another subject capable of
inflaming debate.  In 2002, sociologist James Q. Wilson contended that
greater family instability weakened society.  For Wilson, the “single core
event” underlying the questioning of marriage was the emancipation of
621–29 (1988); Leslie Joan Harris, The Basis for Legal Parentage and the Clash Between Custody
and Child Support, 42 IND. L. REV. 611, 612–14 (2009); Jill Elaine Hasday, Parenthood Divided:
A Legal History of the Bifurcated Law of Parental Relations, 90 GEO. L.J. 299, 368–71 (2002);
Daniel L. Hatcher, Child Support Harming Children: Subordinating the Best Interests of Children
to the Fiscal Interests of the State, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1029, 1043–44 (2007); Amy E.
Hirsch, Income Deeming in the AFDC Program: Using Dual Track Family Law to Make Poor Women
Poorer, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 713, 715–16 (1988).
37 See, e.g., Maxine Eichner, The Privatized American Family, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 213,
255–58 (2017) (discussing the disingenuous nature of much of the empirical work).
38 See, in particular, WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS: THE WORLD OF
THE NEW URBAN POOR [hereinafter WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS] (1996) (examining
the impact of the loss of well-paying and stable blue collar jobs on rustbelt cities); and
WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE UNDERCLASS, AND
PUBLIC POLICY 83 (2d ed. 1987) (arguing that the change in family structure stemmed from
a mismatch between the number of eligible males and females, with a significant percent-
age of African American men becoming unmarriageable because of high rates of unem-
ployment, imprisonment, and other factors).
39 Douglas S. Massey & Robert J. Sampson, Moynihan Redux: Legacies and Lessons, 621
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 6, 13 (2009).
40 Ta-Nehisi Coates, Revisiting the Moynihan Report, Cont., ATLANTIC (June 18, 2013),
https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/06/revisiting-the-moynihan-report-
cont/276978/ (“There’s no real political cost to telling people to get married. . . .  Telling
them that there should be a jobs program that makes more men marriage-material is dif-
ferent.”); see also Eichner, supra note 37, at 257 (describing the ideologically driven
“rollback of American welfare policies, beginning with the decentralization of unemploy-
ment insurance and Medicaid to the states during the Reagan era, and continuing with
welfare reform under President Clinton in 1996” (citations omitted)).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\95-4\NDL407.txt unknown Seq: 9  1-MAY-20 14:49
2020] a  consumer  guide  to  empirical  family  law 1601
women, starting in the Enlightenment.41  Once women no longer had to rely
on men to provide them with a home or social status, they did not need
marriage.  They finally gained the power to leave abusive or neglectful rela-
tionships—or forego them altogether.42  The changing status of women was
thus responsible for social decay.
These observations, of course, set up empirical questions.  Did women’s
greater acquisition of legal rights, including the ability to leave “abusive or
neglectful relationships,” constitute the principal driver of family change?
Or was women’s greater economic independence, with their entry into the
labor market, the more important factor?43  How did women’s changing sta-
tus then interact with the changing labor market for men?44  And how did
the changing legal basis for marriage, divorce, cohabitation, parentage, and
custody influence the results?
If you answered, we do not know, you would be right.  That is, while it is
easy to find opinions on the subject, it is hard to find empirical research that
fully engages these issues.45  To be sure, such research exists.  For example, it
is difficult to overstate the importance of the “fragile families” studies that
changed our understanding of unmarried parenting.46  This work estab-
lished that, contrary to popular expectations, “unmarried mothers,” at the
time of their children’s births, were not typically “single mothers.”  Instead,
the vast majority were in relationships with their children’s fathers, with
approximately half living with the fathers at the time of the birth.47  In addi-
tion, ethnographic research establishes that unmarried couples value mar-
riage48 and that the primary factors breaking up unmarried relationships are
domestic violence and infidelity.49
41 JAMES Q. WILSON, THE MARRIAGE PROBLEM: HOW OUR CULTURE HAS WEAKENED FAMI-
LIES 89 (2002) (observing that “[u]nderlying the questioning of marriage was a single core
event: the slow emancipation of women”).
42 Id. at 214 (referring to the ability to leave abusive or neglectful relationships).
43 See, e.g., Brinig, supra note 4, at 181 (setting up the foundational nature of these
questions for teaching about the family).
44 See, e.g., Maxine Eichner, The Family, in Context, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1980 (2015)
(book review) (reviewing the limited literature examining the impact of market forces on
the family).
45 One reason is that the public debate shifted from largely academic research to
cause-funded think tanks issuing ideologically motivated reports. See, e.g., JANE MAYER,
DARK MONEY: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF THE BILLIONAIRES BEHIND THE RISE OF THE RADICAL
RIGHT 111, 135–43, 157–88 (2016) (detailing right-wing funding of think tanks and aca-
demics to attack liberal welfare policies).
46 See Sara McLanahan & Irwin Garfinkel, The Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study:
Questions, Design, and a Few Preliminary Results 41 (Ctr. for Research on Child Wellbeing,
Working Paper No. 1208-00, 2000), https://fragilefamilies.princeton.edu/sites/fragilefami
lies/files/wp00-07-ff-mclanahan.pdf.
47 Id. (indicating that more than eighty percent were in romantic relationships and
nearly half were living with the fathers).
48 See KATHRYN EDIN & MARIA KEFALAS, PROMISES I CAN KEEP: WHY POOR WOMEN PUT
MOTHERHOOD BEFORE MARRIAGE 6 (2005).
49 See id. at 81.
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What does not exist is a robust family law discourse integrating the
empirical findings into comprehensive visions of legal regulation and family
life.  This is difficult to do when some deny the basic premises of such
research with, for example, some sociologists insisting that “economics can’t
explain our cultural divide.”50  At the same time, economists like Gary
Becker insist that legal changes cannot explain family transformation
because couples will simply bargain around the legal obstacles.51  And many
legal scholars, who often believe that the law in fact impacts family change,
still maintain that “no U.S. legal scholar has crystallized the theoretical issue
of state regulation of market forces on families” or “articulated a model of
regulation that supports families.”52
Instead, empirical work on families either selectively influences narrowly
constructed policy questions, such as the effectiveness of child support
enforcement,53 or it takes place within the framework constructed by the
social sciences, and those discourses limit the utility of empirical work for
family law.
II. WRONG DIRECTIONS PART I: THE ECONOMIC FRAMEWORK
The law-and-economics movement greatly increased the influence of
economics on legal analysis, and the family is no exception.54  Beginning
with Gary’s Becker’s A Treatise on the Family, which contributed to the Nobel
Prize in Economics he received in 1992,55 Becker and like-minded econo-
mists applied the neoclassical economic framework to family decisionmaking.
In his acceptance speech, he described his 1981 treatise as “the most difficult
sustained intellectual effort I have undertaken.”56  Central to Becker’s treat-
50 Charles Murray, Why Economics Can’t Explain Our Cultural Divide, WALL ST. J. (March
16, 2012) (capitalization altered), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405270230469
2804577281582403394206; see also James Q. Wilson, Why We Don’t Marry, CITY J., Winter
2002, at 46, https://www.city-journal.org/html/why-we-don%E2%80%99t-marry-12215
.html (explaining why economic factors cannot explain cultural changes).
51 See Brinig, supra note 4, at 180–81 (explaining that Becker’s position relied on the
Coase theorem, which assumed that the absence of transaction costs, and the notion that
transition acts do not exist with respect to the enforcement of family contracts is
preposterous).
52 Eichner, supra note 37, at 216–17.
53 See supra notes 13–14 and accompanying text.
54 See generally FEMINISM CONFRONTS HOMO ECONOMICUS, supra note 18, at ix, 401–02
(observing that the modern extension of economic analysis to the family begins with Gary
Becker).
55 See, e.g., Claire A. Hill, Law and Economics in the Personal Sphere, 29 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 219, 220 (2004) (observing that “Becker won the 1992 Nobel Prize in economics
‘for having extended the domain of microeconomic analysis to a wide range of human
behaviour and interaction, including nonmarket behavior’” (quoting Press Release, Kungl
Vetenskapsakademien Royal Swedish Acad. of Scis., This Year’s Laureate Has Extended the
Sphere of Economic Analysis to New Areas of Human Behavior and Relations (Oct. 13,
1992), https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/economic-sciences/1992/press-release/)).
56 Gary S. Becker, Nobel Lecture: The Economic Way of Looking at Behavior, 101 J. POL.
ECON. 385, 395 (1993).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\95-4\NDL407.txt unknown Seq: 11  1-MAY-20 14:49
2020] a  consumer  guide  to  empirical  family  law 1603
ment of the family was his justification of the gendered assignment of family
roles as efficient; he accordingly saw women’s entry into the paid labor as
reducing the gains from marriage, increasing divorce, and undermining fam-
ily stability.  The problem with Becker’s analysis is that its premises and its
predictions proved spectacularly wrong.  Yet, it continues to frame the dis-
course about the economics of the family.
The great irony for Becker’s legacy is that his approach to the family
combined some of his most valuable contributions with some of his worst—
and the value of his analysis would have been strengthened had his ideas
been developed as part of a discourse that allowed them to be developed
together.  Perhaps Becker’s most lasting contribution to economic analysis is
the notion of human capital.  Becker treated human capital as the product of
investments such as education, training, experience, and health care.57  He
also argued that the impact of investment could be measured by examining,
for example, income differences between high school and college graduates,
thus providing a market measure of the value of higher education.58
Rather than see the family as a vehicle for human capital investment,
however, he tied the value of marriage to the notion of “specialization” as the
foundation for the family.  Becker argued that “a married couple could gain
much from a sharp division of labor because the husband would specialize in
some types of human capital and the wife in others.”59  Becker then went on
to describe husbands as specializing in market labor while wives specialized
in household tasks.60  Using the theory of comparative advantage, he posited
that marriage offered a way to realize gains from specialization and trade.
Just as two islands would be better off specializing in coconuts and pineap-
ples and trading, he predicted that the husbands who are most successful in
the market (measured by their income) would want wives who specialize in
the home, and that dual-earner unions should therefore be less stable than
more traditional breadmaker/homemaker marriages because the gains from
the exchange would be less.61
This idea has proved pernicious in multiple ways.  First, it generated pre-
dictions that turned out to be flat wrong.  Contrary to Becker’s theory, the
only group in American society whose marriage rates have increased are the
top ten percent of women by income.62  And the marriages of dual-career
couples, particularly those where both spouses acquire greater human capi-
tal, have become more stable with time, with much greater stability than
57 Id. at 392.
58 See id. at 393–94.
59 Id. at 397.
60 Id.
61 BECKER, supra note 19, at 43.
62 Michael Greenstone & Adam Looney, The Marriage Gap: The Impact of Economic and
Technological Change on Marriage Rates, HAMILTON PROJECT (Feb. 3, 2012), http://www.ham
iltonproject.org/papers/the_marriage_gap_the_impact_of_economic_and_technological_
change_on_ma/.
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traditional marriages further down the socioeconomic ladder.63  Economists
who begin their discussion of the family by genuflecting to Becker then typi-
cally distance themselves by noting the inaccuracy of these predictions.64
Second, the theory itself rests on flawed premises.  The equations that
model Becker’s theorems incorporate assumptions about increasing returns
to scale.65  But what does this mean within the family?  Becker himself, in his
work on fertility, rejected the notion that household production should be
defined in terms of the number of children.66  And others have lampooned
the idea that “specializing” in the home has returns to scale.  Does it mean
that baking twenty batches of cookies is more efficient than one?67  More
fundamentally, how does caring for children, cooking the meals, doing
the laundry, overseeing homework, and cleaning floors constitute
specialization?68
Third, and most importantly, the theory diverted the economic study of
the family in ways that continued long after the economists moved away from
Becker’s predictions (and implicitly his theorems).  As noted in the introduc-
tion, economist Robert Pollak acknowledged the extent to which the eco-
nomics of the family continues to reflect Becker’s influence in “the tools we
use, the questions we ask, and the answers we give.”69  This has stood in the
way of greater dialogue between economists and legal scholars, with one
economist turned law professor advising the abandonment of neoclassical
economic methods altogether.70
63 See, e.g., SHAWN FREMSTAD & MELISSA BOTEACH, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, VALUING ALL
OUR FAMILIES: PROGRESSIVE POLICIES THAT STRENGTHEN FAMILY COMMITMENTS AND REDUCE
FAMILY DISPARITIES (2015).
64 See, e.g., Stevenson & Wolfers, supra note 20, at 43 (noting the inaccuracy of
Becker’s assertion that the higher-earning men would want to marry full-time homemak-
ers).  Since then, however, a development not on the horizon at the time Becker wrote
does make him look more prescient.  Today, in a much more competitive and unequal
economy, the highest earners work much longer hours than they did before 1980, and
much longer hours than middle-income earners.  As a result, many high-earning couples
do have a spouse who takes on primary responsibility for child care (while contracting out
other domestic services). See, e.g., Claire Cain Miller, Women Did Everything Right. Then Work
Got ‘Greedy.’ How America’s Obsession with Long Hours Has Widened the Gender Gap, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 26, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/26/upshot/women-long-hours-
greedy-professions.html.
65 BECKER, supra note 19, at 35.
66 Becker, supra note 56, at 397; see also Gary S. Becker et al., Human Capital, Fertility,
and Economic Growth, 98 J. POL. ECON. S12 (1990) (describing tradeoffs between quality and
quantity of children).
67 See, e.g., June Carbone, What Do Women Really Want? Economics, Justice and the Market
for Intimate Relationships, in FEMINISM CONFRONTS HOMO ECONOMICUS, supra note 18, at 405,
407–08.
68 See id.  In contrast, specialization among men and among women in careers can pay
off quite handsomely. See Cain Miller, supra note 64 (observing increasing payoff to longer
hours in the highest paying occupation).
69 Pollak, supra note 21, at 111.
70 Neil H. Buchanan, Playing with Fire: Feminist Legal Theorists and the Tools of Economics,
in FEMINISM CONFRONTS HOMO ECONOMICUS, supra note 18, at 61–93 (suggesting that the
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In considering empirical work on the family, the problem is not just that
Becker erred in some places (while getting other things right), but that the
dominance of his vision influenced the interpretation of work done by
others71 and constitutes an obstacle to the construction of more robust
understandings of family dynamics.  And this is true despite the fact that bet-
ter accounts use many of the same elements that Becker did.  Professor
Brinig, in early work we coauthored, drew on historical analyses of the family
changes that accompanied the rise of industrialization to argue that Becker
misrepresented the very idea of specialization.  What produces increasing
returns to scale, after all, is not simply growing more coconuts (or palm
trees),72 but investing in the equipment and organization that increases pro-
ductivity.  Within the family, such investment takes the form of investment in
children, enhancing their earning potential as adults.  And specialization
within the family is not a story of age-old differentiation between women and
men, home and market, but rather reorganization over time to facilitate
greater investment in children.73  This greater investment, in turn, paid off
in the nineteenth century because of greater specialization among men, and
in the twentieth century because of greater specialization among women,
each time requiring a different organization of the family to facilitate the
investment.74  This analysis often uses the same vocabulary as Becker (spe-
cialization, investment, human capital).75  Yet, it produces a radically differ-
ent picture: specialization among men that rewarded the human capital
investment producing the rising middle class of the nineteenth century; spe-
cialization among women that rewards the investment remaking the pathways
into the upper-middle class of the late twentieth century.76  Casting the
inquiry in these terms also has different consequences.  The analysis becomes
a story about increasing inequality as much as it is about efficiency, and it
rational actor model built into the core of Becker-style neoclassical economics is so flawed
and so filled with hidden and biased assumptions that feminists should reject it entirely as
an appropriate method).
71 Autor et al., supra note 22, at 163 (observing that “a fall in the relative economic
stature of men diminishes the gains from household specialization and therefore reduces
the prevalence of marriage” (emphasis omitted)).
72 See, e.g., Abrahm Lustgarten, Palm Oil Was Supposed to Help Save the Planet. Instead It
Unleashed a Catastrophe, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Nov. 20, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/
11/20/magazine/palm-oil-borneo-climate-catastrophe.html (discussing disadvantages of
Borneo’s specialization in palm oil production).
73 See June Carbone & Margaret F. Brinig, Rethinking Marriage: Feminist Ideology, Eco-
nomic Change, and Divorce Reform, 65 TUL. L. REV. 953, 955 (1991) (arguing that the nine-
teenth century involved greater specialization among men to supply the needs of the
emerging industrial economy and that the twentieth century has involved greater speciali-
zation among women to meet the different labor demands of the postindustrial economy).
74 Id.
75 Id. at 955 (specialization), 966, 971 (investment), 1001 (human capital).
76 See id. at 955.
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ultimately suggests different ways of interpreting empirical findings and
understanding family change.77
This work, focusing on investment in children rather than gender differ-
entiated roles, integrates a broader body of research into the analysis.  It
draws heavily on historical research describing the family of the separate
spheres, with its separation of home and market, not as a universal of the
human family, but as an artifact of industrialization.78  With the movement of
men and productive activities out of the household and into the market, the
purpose of the home—and women’s roles within it—changed.  Middle-class
mothers oversaw their children’s education and moral development, ensur-
ing not only that the children stayed in school longer, but that the boys did
not get the girls pregnant too soon.79  The postponement of marriage and
childbearing became important partly so that the boys could complete the
education and training that would increase their employment prospects, and
partly so that they would have sufficient incomes to facilitate the investment
in the next generation when they did have families.80  The men of this era
did not invest in “the market” as an undifferentiated activity, but rather in
specific types of employment.  The new pathways to the middle class became
the professions: science and engineering, managerial roles, and other posi-
tions that required more formal education, training, or experience.81  Access
to these positions required greater specialization among men, a specializa-
tion that was the product of human capital investment.82  To facilitate that
investment required a reorganization of the family and of women’s roles
within it.83  The shift from the agricultural to the industrial era, however, was
as much about the creation of greater class differences—the product of the
fact that the greater ability to invest in children was not universally availa-
ble—as it was about greater specialization between men’s and women’s roles.
This model of greater specialization among men similarly applies to the
greater specialization among women that occurred in the twentieth century.
The changes started with the expansion of the service economy and greater
77 See, e.g., Margaret F. Brinig, Some Concerns About Applying Economics to Family Law, in
FEMINISM CONFRONTS HOMO ECONOMICUS, supra note 18, at 450 (discussing the limits of
economic analysis).
78 See Carbone & Brinig, supra note 73, at 973–74 (describing nineteenth-century
changes).
79 See MARY P. RYAN, CRADLE OF THE MIDDLE CLASS: THE FAMILY IN ONEIDA COUNTY,
NEW YORK, 1790–1865, at 184–85 (1981) (describing how middle-class status required
greater moral instruction and supervision of the young in nineteenth-century Utica, New
York).
80 Id. (describing increase in the average age of marriage).
81 See, e.g., W. ELLIOT BROWNLEE & MARY M. BROWNLEE, WOMEN IN THE AMERICAN
ECONOMY: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, 1675 TO 1929, at 26 (1976) (discussing greater impor-
tance of education to the middle class).
82 Id.
83 See also RYAN, supra note 79, at 184–85 (describing how “native-born couples began
in the 1830s to limit their family size, thereby concentrating scarce financial and emotional
resources on the care and education of fewer children”).
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demand for women’s market labor,84 and women’s greater demand in turn
for nannies, housekeepers, labor-saving devices, and fast-food restaurants.85
The changes accelerated as women embraced the pill and abortion in the
seventies and increased their educational levels over the next several
decades.86  With growing economic inequality, payoffs increased further for
investment in children.  Middle-class couples responded as they did in the
nineteenth century: by delaying marriage and childbearing, reducing fertil-
ity, and reorganizing family roles to facilitate more intensive parenting.87
Today, for example, better-off mothers spend an hour a day more in develop-
ment time with their children than do poorer mothers, and income differ-
ences matter more to child outcomes than they once did among parents with
similar levels of education.88  The results are very similar to those in the nine-
teenth century: greater class differences as a result of dramatically greater
class-based differences in investment in children.89
Recasting changes in the family in this way changes the questions asked
and interpretations of the results that come from empirical research.  For
example, Lloyd Cohen’s early work on the move to unilateral divorce
assumed that the only way to encourage a Becker-style “efficient” division of
household labor was to enforce the marriage contract,90 principally by recog-
nizing fault.91  Cohen argued that women would be more vulnerable than
men to the risk of unilateral divorce, adoption of no-fault divorce would
make men more likely to seek divorce, and overall, the family would become
less stable.92
84 Carbone & Brinig, supra note 73, 973 & n.85.
85 PAUL R. AMATO ET AL., ALONE TOGETHER: HOW MARRIAGE IN AMERICA IS CHANGING
123–24 (2007) (observing that women’s workforce participation conflicted less with family
life for better-educated women because of their greater ability “to afford services, such as
high-quality child care, take-out meals, and home cleaning, that help to ease the family
burdens associated with dual employment”).
86 See generally Claudia Goldin & Lawrence F. Katz, The Power of the Pill: Oral Contracep-
tives and Women’s Career and Marriage Decisions, 110 J. POL. ECON. 730 (2002) (describing
how the greater ability to control reproduction contributed to women’s greater educa-
tional attainment).
87 See HYMOWITZ ET AL., supra note 30, at 8 fig.IIA (showing steady increase in average
age of marriage for college graduates); see also Adam Isen & Betsey Stevenson, Women’s
Education and Family Behavior: Trends in Marriage, Divorce and Fertility 21 (Nat’l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15725, 2010), http://www.nber.org/papers/w15725
.pdf (describing increased differences by education).
88 See ROBERT D. PUTNAM ET AL., HARVARD SCH. OF GOV’T, GROWING CLASS GAPS IN
SOCIAL CONNECTEDNESS AMONG AMERICAN YOUTH, 1975–2009, at 10 fig.3 (2012), https://
hceconomics.uchicago.edu/sites/default/files/file_uploads/Putnam-etal_2012_Growing-
Class-Gaps.pdf.
89 Id. at 11 (summarizing the differences).
90 See BECKER, supra note 19, at 14–37.  Becker wrote that “one can even say that ‘mar-
riage’ is defined by a long-term commitment between a man and a woman.” Id. at 31.
91 See generally Lloyd Cohen, Marriage, Divorce, and Quasi Rents; or, “I Gave Him the Best
Years of My Life,” 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 267 (1987).
92 Id. at 287, 303.
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Empirical work on divorce, however, suggests a different story.  The
states provided a natural laboratory as they reformed their divorce laws at
different times.  Those adopting no-fault grounds generally did experience
an increase in divorce rates immediately following the reforms.93  Over time,
however, the rates across the states converged.  Economist Stéphane Mechou-
lan found that the states eliminating consideration of fault in the property
division produced later marriage ages.94  The change in the age of marriage
by itself produced a small but statistically significant decline in divorce
rates.95  The much bigger effect was the increase in “assortative matching,”
that is, the tendency of better-educated and higher-earning men and women
to marry each other.96  While Mechoulan speculated that the greater age at
marriage was due to women’s more careful search for mates, he acknowl-
edged that a full understanding of the results “awaits being connected with
other branches of research.”97  Since then, divorce rates have fallen further,
particularly for college graduates, with most researchers speculating about
the impact of later marriages, and perhaps a change in the composition of
those who do marry.98  But Mechoulan’s interpretation of his results, which
primarily referenced Lloyd Cohen, suggested that women engaged in long
searches because they could no longer rely on enforcement of the marriage
contract to protect their investments in household production.99  The alter-
native, of course, is that the later age of marriage was part of a shift to a new
family model, with adoption of no-fault grounds, later marriage, and greater
assortative mating all serving as mutually reinforcing indicia of the shift.100
Some of Professor Brinig’s most influential work builds on—and ques-
tions—Cohen’s analysis.  In an article with Doug Allen, Brinig found that
contrary to Cohen’s predictions, women initiate approximately two-thirds of
93 Stéphane Mechoulan, Divorce Laws and the Structure of the American Family, 35 J.
LEGAL STUD. 143, 145–46 (2006).
94 Id. at 165.  Other research, however, has found that the property divisions and cus-
tody results in fault and no-fault states are approximately the same.  See Margaret F. Brinig
& Michael V. Alexeev, Legal Rules, Bargaining, and Transactions Costs: The Case of Divorce, in
SYSTEMATIC ANALYSIS IN DISPUTE RESOLUTION 91, 98 tbl.6.1 (Stuart S. Nagel & Miriam K.
Mills eds., 2002).
95 Mechoulan, supra note 93, at 165.
96 Id. at 164–66 (tying the effect to women’s later age of marriage and their tendency
to marry men with similar levels of education); see also Christine R. Schwartz, Earnings
Inequality and the Changing Association Between Spouses’ Earnings, 115 AM. J. SOC. 1524 (2010)
(describing the increase in high-earning couples to marry each other, with the greatest
gains in family income going to the women who marry high-earning men, increasing socie-
tal income inequality).
97 Mechoulan, supra note 93, at 166.
98 See Joe Pinsker, The Not-So-Great Reason Divorce Rates Are Declining, ATLANTIC (Sept.
25, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/family/archive/2018/09/millennials-divorce-
baby-boomers/571282/.
99 See Mechoulan, supra note 93, at 165.
100 For discussion of this new model and the relationship to an older age of marriage,
see NAOMI CAHN & JUNE CARBONE, RED FAMILIES V. BLUE FAMILIES: LEGAL POLARIZATION AND
THE CREATION OF CULTURE (2010).
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divorces and have done so dating back to periods long before the adoption
of no-fault divorce.101  The principal exception involved older men in long
term marriages; they were more likely than their wives to initiate the proceed-
ings.102  Brinig and Allen also found that expectations about custody influ-
ence divorce filing.  Women who anticipate that their husbands will receive
custody become dramatically less likely to file for divorce,103 leading the
authors to conclude that expectations about custody are “by far” the most
important factor in determining who files for divorce.104  These findings, in
general, suggest a more complex picture about the role of divorce.  The
authors, however, filter most of their discussion through the economic
frames provided by Becker and Cohen.105  Yet, their most intriguing finding
is the substantial effect custody laws have in discouraging women from filing
for divorce.106  As I have argued elsewhere, this suggests not just that custody
laws have an impact on the incidence of divorce, but they may also influence
the decision to marry.107  Since this conclusion did not fit within the eco-
nomic discourse at the time, however, the authors did not consider it, nor is
there subsequent empirical work testing the idea in the United States.  Yet,
the notion that custody terms rather than fault or property issues are an
important factor in divorce decisions has profound implications—implica-
tions that deserve a more in-depth consideration in family law.
Brinig’s empirical work with Steve Nock took on the idea of specializa-
tion more directly.  Nock and Brinig found that the divorce rate does not
increase with women taking on more “male” tasks; instead, it goes down.108
Perhaps, more surprisingly, they also found that whenever men or women
take on more “female” tasks, family instability increases.109  The happiest
families appear to be those where neither spouse does the housework.  Brinig
and Nock’s most innovative finding, however, involves the issues of fairness.
Their study shows “that the most stable marriages were not those in which
both husband and wife felt that the division of labor force and household
101 Margaret F. Brinig & Douglas W. Allen, “These Boots Are Made for Walking”: Why Most
Divorce Filers Are Women, 2 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 126, 128 (2000).  The authors also found
evidence that the person filing appeared generally to be the person who initiated the
divorce. Id. at 154.
102 Id. at 143–45.
103 Id. at 155.
104 Id. at 158.
105 Id. at 128–30, 133, 135, 138, 142–43 (discussing Cohen’s theories about opportunis-
tic behavior, particularly when older husbands leave long-term wives).
106 Id. at 158.
107 See CARBONE & CAHN, supra note 32, at 117 (observing that even if custody laws that
apply to married and unmarried couples are the same, shared custody in at least some
form has become automatic in many states at divorce, while for unmarried couples there is
no proceeding at separation, disadvantaging unmarried fathers who would prefer stronger
custody rights).
108 Steven L. Nock & Margaret F. Brinig, Weak Men and Disorderly Women: Divorce and the
Division of Labor, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE 171, 186 (Antony
W. Dnes & Robert Rowthorn eds., 2002) (emphasis omitted).
109 Id. at 183.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\95-4\NDL407.txt unknown Seq: 18  1-MAY-20 14:49
1610 notre dame law review [vol. 95:4
responsibilities was ‘about right.’”110  Rather, the most stable families are
“those in which the work inequality was recognized by both spouses,” and
each agreed that the other took on an unfair amount of work.111  In other
words, when each spouse sympathized with the other, the marriage was more
likely to last.
This work is innovative and important.  Still, its significance and impact
might be greater if, instead of interpreting the findings through the lens of
Becker’s clearly misplaced theories of specialization, it was being interpreted
in light of the growing literature on class division.  In Alone Together, for
example, Amato and his colleagues also found that women’s workforce par-
ticipation did not in itself destabilize relationships, and that the impact
depended on perceptions of fairness.112  But this work linked the percep-
tions of fairness to the dynamics that underlie class, finding that “dual-earner
arrangements [i.e., two working spouses] are linked with positive marital
quality among middle-class couples and with negative marital quality among
working-class couples.”113  The middle-class couples in the study had careers
that were often a source of satisfaction for both.  Many of the working-class
wives, on the other hand, worked outside the home more than they would
have liked because of what they perceived as their husbands’ failures to keep
their end of the bargain.  As a result, the income the women produced came
at “a steep price in the form of greater marital tension, low job satisfaction,
and a desire . . .  to decrease . . . hours of employment or return to . . .
homemaking.”114  The middle-class couples, in turn, may have been more
content with the division of family responsibilities because they could “afford
services, such as high-quality child care, take-out meals, and home cleaning,
that help to ease the family burdens associated with dual employment.”115
Perhaps the most striking finding in the study was that between 1980 and
2000, couples who reported feeling substantial economic distress had
become far more divorce prone, while those reporting greater financial
security had become substantially less divorce prone.116  These results corre-
late, in turn, with findings that, beginning in the mid-1990s, divorce rates
were diverging by class, increasing sharply for the working class while falling
for college graduates.117
Considered as a whole, the empirical studies of the family influenced by
the intersection of economic analysis and legal change present, at best, an
incomplete picture.  They consistently find that women’s “specialization” in
the home seems to have very little to do with relationship stability.  More
110 Margaret F. Brinig & Steven L. Nock, “I Only Want Trust”: Norms, Trust, and Auton-
omy, 32 J. SOCIO-ECON. 471, 476 (2003); see also Nock & Brinig, supra note 108, at 188.
111 Brinig & Nock, supra note 110, at 476 (emphasis omitted).
112 AMATO ET AL., supra note 85, at 163–64.
113 Id. at 139.
114 Id.
115 Id. at 123–24.
116 Id. at 132, fig.4.8.
117 See McLanahan, supra note 30, at 607–08, 617.
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intriguingly, the Brinig and Nock results tied together with Amato’s work and
sociological studies going back to the Moynihan report to suggest that male
failure to live up to the income earning role may be of greater significance
than women’s workforce participation in predicting family dissolution.
Brinig’s work also implies that the relationship to children is more important
than who mops the floors, making changes in custody law at least as impor-
tant as the property division and divorce grounds in affecting relationship
decisionmaking.  Indeed, the fact that men are more likely to initiate divorce
only after longer term marriages when presumably the children have grown
while women are more likely to file for divorce while the children are still
young, provides a tantalizing indication that family law dynamics are more
multifaceted than the conventional analyses indicate.  The pieces of the puz-
zle that emerge from the empirical work as a whole thus provide clues to the
construction of overall picture, but without a discourse that places the differ-
ent pieces in context with each other, that picture has yet to come into focus.
III. WRONG DIRECTIONS PART II: THE SECOND DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION
AND THE FOCUS ON CULTURE
If imperial economics has supplied a dominant discourse for the con-
struction of empirical work on family law, the competing discourse has come
from sociology.  This discourse has insisted that economics cannot explain
family change; the answers need to lie with shifts in cultural norms, as though
economic changes and cultural shifts are necessarily distinct.  At times, this
insistence that economics cannot explain the changing family has been
remarkably broad.118  In examining the impact of welfare benefits, for exam-
ple, conservative critic Charles Murray argued that the expansion of the Aid
to Dependent Children program undermined the cultural connections
between marriage and childbearing, but dismissed the possibility that the dis-
appearance of decent-paying blue-collar jobs had anything to do with the
result.119  Those opposed to Murray, on the other hand, often responded by
rejecting out of hand the idea that women have children in order receive
welfare benefits, without considering whether welfare benefits might influ-
ence the feedback loops that strengthen or weaken the societal norms associ-
ated with childrearing.120  These positions obscure the possibility that long-
118 For a description of skepticism more generally, see Hill, supra note 55, at 219
(describing the particularly strong hostility toward extending law and economics into the
personal sphere).
119 See CHARLES MURRAY, COMING APART: THE STATE OF WHITE AMERICA, 1960–2010, at
178 (2012) (again insisting that the changing employment picture cannot explain the
change in norms) [hereinafter MURRAY, COMING APART]; CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING
GROUND: AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY, 1950–1980 (1984); Murray, supra note 50.
120 See Hill, supra note 55, at 249 (observing that “[i]n many circles, it is of course quite
controversial to argue that if it’s made more financially advantageous for a woman to have
a child, she’s more apt to do so”); Huntington, supra note 1, at 275 (discussing the contro-
versies over empirical efforts to measure whether providing low-income families with mate-
rial support affects their childrearing behavior).
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term economic changes may create environments receptive to norm shifts,
and that the norm shifts may take hold more completely when they help
navigate the economic changes.  Economics and cultural norms may simulta-
neously be separate from each other and intertwined in complex and mutu-
ally reinforcing ways.121  Yet, much of this literature seems determined to
deny the possibility that economic changes can have anything to do with
changing morality.122
It is therefore disappointing that one of most promising efforts to cap-
ture the interaction between economic change and cultural norms, the SDT,
has been narrowly cabined.123  The SDT concept starts with empirical demo-
graphic findings.  Ron Lesthaeghe, one of the SDT’s originators, uses the
term to describe long-term historical trends that include “subreplacement
fertility,” that is, falling fertility trends that will produce a falling global popu-
lation, “a multitude of living arrangements other than marriage, [and] a dis-
connection between marriage and procreation.”124  Lesthaeghe also
positions the second demographic transition in apposition to the first demo-
graphic transition, which accompanied industrialization and also included
falling fertility, later age of marriage, greater investment in children,125 and,
at least initially, greater economic inequality.126  Lesthaeghe presents the
SDT as an “‘overarching’ theory that spans both economic and sociological
reasoning.”127  It does this by addressing “ideational changes,” that is,
changes in cultural concepts creating new norms that remain stable through
fluctuations in the economic cycle.128  Practically, this means that although
economic shifts may provide the context for cultural change, once a cultural
shift occurs, it tends to last through good times and bad.
The limiting part of the SDT analysis is its attribution of cause.  Les-
thaeghe acknowledges that the first demographic transition accompanied
the rise of industrialization, but only obliquely ties the family shifts to the
121 See, e.g., Hill, supra note 55, at 220.
122 See, e.g., Wilson, supra note 50 (explaining why economic factors cannot explain
cultural changes).  Some of this, of course, may come from an unduly narrow view of eco-
nomics, conflating reliance on the rational actor model or equations calculating the margi-
nal effect of a change in price with a broader consideration of the role of economic
transformations such as industrialization and deindustrialization on cultural develop-
ments. Compare Buchanan, supra note 70, at 62 (critiquing the limits of economic method-
ology), with Hill, supra note 55 (defining its utility in broader terms).
123 See generally Ron Lesthaeghe, The Second Demographic Transition: A Concise Overview of
Its Development, 111 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 18112 (2014).
124 Id. at 18112.
125 Id. (noting the first demographic transition was “unleashed by an enormous senti-
mental and financial investment in the child” (quoting Philippe Aries, Two Successive Moti-
vations for the Declining Birth Rate in the West, 6 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 645, 649 (1980))).
126 Lesthaeghe does not mention inequality, but the most influential application to
American family changes does. See McLanahan, supra note 30, at 608.
127 Lesthaeghe, supra note 123, at 18113.
128 Id.
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economic changes.129  And he claims that “[t]he SDT theory fully recognizes
the effects of macrolevel structural changes and of microlevel economic
calculus,” without saying anything more about them.130  Instead, the SDT
refers to Maslow’s theory of changing needs.  This theory posits that “[a]s
populations become wealthier and more educated, the attention shifts away
from needs associated with survival, security, and solidarity” and places
greater weight instead on “individual self-realization, recognition, grassroots
democracy, expressive work, and educational values.”131  It is this value shift
that explains the changing family, as individuals become freer to seek per-
sonal fulfillment.132
Some of the scholars who embrace this view then attribute higher
divorce and nonmarital birth rates to the dismantling of the social discipline
that came with the assumption of prescribed roles.  Brad Wilcox and Jeffrey
Dew, for example, argue that marriage has become a marker of personal
fulfillment, referring to a shift from “institutional marriage” to “soulmate
marriage,” that is, the selection of a partner based on sexual and emotional
intimacy.133  These scholars then conclude that sexual and emotional inti-
macy is a flimsy foundation for family relationships, particularly in contrast
with unions based on a commitment to permanence and an assignment of
gendered roles.134  They express concern about the break-up of “good
enough” marriages because of conflict about family responsibilities or the
failure to meet one or the other of the spouse’s higher-order expressive
needs.135  Other sociologists see the change in marriage to an “intensely pri-
vate spiritualized union” that symbolizes personal self-development as a rea-
son couples do not marry.136  Andrew Cherlin, for example, in a study of
working- and lower-middle-class couples, described marriage as a marker of
“individual achievement,” with the couples in his study insisting on a secure
129 Id. at 18114 (stating that religious groups feared “that urbanization and industriali-
zation would lead to immorality and atheism,” and these groups together with socialist and
liberal parties, “saw the family as the cornerstone of society,” best served “by a sharp sex-
based division within the family: husbands assume their roles as devoted breadwinners and
women as guardians of quality-related issues in the home (order and neatness, health,
education, etc.)”).
130 Id. at 18112.
131 Id. at 18113.
132 See GROSSMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 27, at 8–9.
133 W. Bradford Wilcox & Jeffrey Dew, Is Love a Flimsy Foundation? Soulmate Versus Insti-
tutional Models of Marriage, 39 SOC. SCI. RES. 687 (2010); see also Andrew J. Cherlin, The
Deinstitutionalization of American Marriage, 66 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 848 (2004) (defining dein-
stitutionalization as the weakening of the social norms that define people’s behavior in a
social institution such as marriage and arguing that the acceptance of cohabitation, chang-
ing marital roles, nonmarital births, and same-sex unions contributed to this weakening).
134 Wilcox & Dew, supra note 133.
135 Brinig and Allen’s work on divorce often fits into these views as they document both
women’s willingness to initiate divorce without traditional fault grounds and older men’s
willingness to leave older, dependent spouses, often for new partners. See Brinig & Allen,
supra note 101, at 144, 150.
136 CHERLIN, supra note 27, at 140.
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economic foundation as a precondition for marriage.137  These couples see
the ability to buy a home, secure stable employment, pay off debts, and
obtain reliable transportation as a precondition for marriage, even if they
already have children together.138  Cherlin associates these attitudes with an
idea of marriage as personal expression rather than institutional design.139
The difficulty with these analyses is that they conflate three different
developments: the centuries-long rise of expressive individualism,140 the dis-
mantling of fixed gender roles and control of women’s sexuality over the last
half century,141 and the increasing class divisions in family life that have
accelerated over the course of the past twenty-five years.142  While scholars
debate the precise contours of expressive individualism, they situate it within
the changing relationship between individual, community, and state.143  In
earlier centuries, the individual’s place within a community might be defined
by kinship ties defined by marriage and lineage; membership in a group-
based religion (Irish Catholics versus Protestant Scots-Irish); and the assump-
tion of a productive role (farmer, duchess, artisan) likely to reflect family
tradition, inheritance, or marriage.144  Modernism, on the other hand,
arguably begins with the embrace of democratic ideals and religious toler-
ance.145  It increases with the individual’s ability to choose a life course
through greater ability to move to a new location and to access to the educa-
tion and training necessary to enter one’s chosen calling.146  And while the
shift from arranged marriages to companionate relationships took centuries
to complete, it became an important symbol of the greater ability of the indi-
137 Id. at 140.
138 Id. at 140–41.
139 Cherlin, supra note 133.
140 See generally EDWARD L. RUBIN, Soul, Self, and Society: The New Morality and the Modern
State (2015) (examining the evolution of changing moral systems over the course of the
last two millennia); June Carbone, “Blue” Morality and the Legitimacy of the State—Ed Rubin’s
Soul, Self, and Society: The New Morality and the Modern State, 42 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY
582, 597–606 (2017) (describing the rise of modern and postmodern notions of morality
tied to individual self-realization).
141 See CAHN & CARBONE, supra note 100 (arguing that a defining element in the cul-
tural polarization is the reaction to women’s changing roles and their impact on the age
and prevalence of marriage.).
142 See generally CARBONE & CAHN, supra note 32.  Income inequality in the United
States begins to increase in by the late seventies, but the class-based divergence in divorce
rates, unintended pregnancy, and nonmarital birth rates takes hold more completely in
the nineties.
143 See, e.g., RUBIN, supra note 140, at 85, 119 (comparing the personalized nature of
royal rule with more democratic and bureaucratic organizations).
144 Id. at 108–11 (describing how societal roles and religious identity contributed to
individual meaning and sense of place in the world).
145 Id. at 194 (linking religious tolerance to the morality of self-fulfillment).
146 See, e.g., id. at 278 (emphasizing that “the modern administrative state is designed to
serve the needs of its citizens, including the basic material needs that every citizen requires,
at a minimum, to pursue his or her chosen life path” (emphasis added)).
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vidual to choose one’s path in life.147  These changes accordingly do frame
many of the more recent changes in the family.148  The problem is tying the
centuries-long developments to recent family changes in ways that make
them the subject of meaningful measurement and discussion.  The embrace
of modernist or postmodern values cannot explain by itself why, in the
United States, for example, divorce rates simultaneously increase for the tra-
ditionalist working class and fall for the modernist upper-middle class.149
The primary alternative explanation involves the role of gender in these
developments.150  When scholars refer to an earlier era of prescribed gender
roles, they are not just referring to Becker-style specialization: men go off to
the factory while women do the laundry.  They are also referring to recipro-
cal moral obligations.  Women in the era before contraception were viewed
as intrinsically vulnerable because of the risk of pregnancy.  The solution was
to channel sexuality into marriage and keep it there—principally by blocking
women’s opportunities for economic independence, stigmatizing women’s
nonmarital sexuality, making divorce difficult, and persuading men to accept
their responsibility to support their dependent wives.151  Indeed, Professor
Brinig has written about the rise of the engagement ring as a form of “extra-
legal contract guarantee” designed to protect women who made the mistake
of sleeping with a man in reliance on his promise to marry her.152  The sex-
ual revolution and the women’s movement changed this equation.  With
greater ability to enter the paid labor market, women gained greater ability
147 Carbone, supra note 140, at 592 (observing that “[w]hile the transition from
arranged marriages to matches chosen on the basis of love took centuries to complete,” it
ultimately made mutual consent to the marriage a critical element in the legitimacy of
marital unions); see also RUBIN, supra note 140, at 95 (describing importance of mutual
consent).
148 And they certainly affect the way we talk past each other. See, e.g., Carbone, supra
note 140, at 597–602 (describing how religious conservatives see the idea of self-actualiza-
tion as license while secular liberals tend to see the idea of the religiously based family
values as hypocrisy); June Carbone, What Does Bristol Palin Have to Do with Same-Sex Mar-
riage?, 45 U.S.F. L. REV. 313, 314 (2010).
149 McLanahan, supra note 30, at 607–08, 617.
150 See Frances Goldscheider et al., The Gender Revolution: A Framework for Understanding
Changing Family and Demographic Behavior, 41 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 207 (2015).
151 Immanuel Kant, for example, concluded that, once a relationship progressed to the
point of creating vulnerability and dependence, a mutual commitment to preserve the
relationship became morally compelled.  “These duties include not committing breaches
of trust, actively promoting the ends of the other, and cultivating the emotions needed to
preserve the relationship.”  Josefine Charlotte Nauckhoff, The Role of the Emotions in the
Moral Life According to Immanuel Kant 265 (1994) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania), https://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3928&
context=edissertations.
152 See Margaret F. Brinig, Rings and Promises, 1 J.L. ECON & ORG. 203, 213 (1990)
(describing engagement rings as an extralegal contract guarantee that arose following the
abolition of “heartbalm” statutes that had recognized a cause of action for breach of the
promise to marry).
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to leave unhappy unions and raise children on their own.153  With access to
contraception and abortion, they obtained greater ability to enjoy sexual rela-
tionships without the risk of pregnancy.154  Men in turn felt less obligation to
marry women they impregnated or to stay with the women they married.155
Feminist scholars argue that much of what has been termed the SDT can be
explained by the adjustment to women’s roles.156  With the permanence of
marriage no longer produced by female dependence or coercive divorce
laws, couples marry later and become pickier about their choice of part-
ners.157  Managing a relationship premised on formal equality is a different
enterprise from managing one based on hierarchy and dependence.158  Psy-
chologists find that for relationships to endure today, it is important for the
partners to maintain equal respect and an ability to engage with each other,
and a sense of fairness in the allocation of relationship responsibilities.159
Thus, what some sociologists see as a search for a “soulmate,” feminists see as
a desire for equal respect.  And American legal scholars have argued that,
within this system, marriage has become premised legally and practically on
formal equality, requiring “high degrees of commitment, maturity, and
trust,”160 and nonmarital relationships have emerged as the alternative for
those who cannot manage relationships on such terms.
The problem with both the SDT and the European feminists’ response is
that it does little to explain the class-based family divisions in the United
States.161  Yet, in American legal circles, the concept of the SDT has taken
153 See generally Brinig, supra note 4.
154 Goldin & Katz, supra note 86, at 747.
155 See George A. Akerlof et al., An Analysis of Out-of-Wedlock Childbearing in the United
States, 111 Q.J. ECON. 277, 278–79 (1996).
156 Goldscheider et al., supra note 150.
157 This development can be explained by multiple factors: the economic advantages of
assortative mating, Schwartz, supra note 96, at 1526; the need for greater maturity and
flexibility in dealing with dual income relationship roles, see June Carbone & Naomi Cahn,
Nonmarriage, 76 MD. L. REV. 55, 59 (2016); and the advantages that come from greater
career investment before marriage and childbearing, HYMOWITZ ET AL., supra note 30, at 8,
14–15.
158 See Hara Estroff Marano, Love and Power, PSYCHOL. TODAY (Jan. 24, 2018), https://
www.psychologytoday.com/us/articles/201401/love-and-power.
159 See id.
160 Carbone & Cahn, supra note 157, at 59.  We also argued that some couples who do
not marry may not do so because their relationships are not only more contingent, but also
more unequal. Id. at 94.
161 See Linda C. McClain, The Other Marriage Equality Problem, 93 B.U. L. REV. 921, 928
(2013) (discussing the role of demographic theories in explaining class divergence in mar-
riage, divorce, and childbearing patterns).  European feminists have argued that “there are
‘two halves’ of the gender revolution.”  Zaidi & Morgan, supra note 23, at 485.  The first
involves the changes in women’s employment that disrupted traditional gender relation-
ships, contributing to the SDT declines in fertility and union stability. Id.  The second
requires a change in men’s roles. Id.  Goldscheider et al. maintain that relationship norms
are moving toward a more equitable division of parenting and household labor, and that
these changes will increase fertility and union stability.  Goldscheider et al., supra note 150,
at 229.  Yet, this response does not address the class-based divergences in male gender
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hold most forcefully in describing the impact of growing economic inequal-
ity.  In 2004, Sara McLanahan’s article Diverging Destinies: How Children Are
Faring Under the Second Demographic Transition162 argued that the first demo-
graphic transition had increased the investment in “child quality” in the
industrialized West while the SDT had both raised and lowered the invest-
ment in children in diverging ways.163  By the fifties, McLanahan maintained
that, as a result of the first demographic transition, children had become
“more likely than those growing up 100 years earlier to live in traditional
nuclear families, to be in good health, and to attend school.”164  A half cen-
tury later, on the other hand, the SDT had produced “two different trajecto-
ries . . . with different implications for children.”165  Most discussions of
cultural change portray college-educated women as leading the fight for the
new values of personal fulfillment; these women embraced the right to enter
into intimate relationships on terms of their choosing, to dismantle gendered
family roles, and to raise children on their own or in untraditional ways.166
McLanahan showed, however, that in fact “college-educated women are
more likely to marry than other women” and “less likely to divorce,” contra-
dicting the argument “that the most economically independent women are
choosing single motherhood over marriage.”167  Instead, the SDT changes
associated with delays in childbearing and increases in maternal employment
have produced dramatically greater family incomes and resources to invest in
childrearing.168  In the meantime, parents who do not attend college have
become less likely to marry, more likely to divorce, more likely to bear chil-
dren outside of marriage, with corresponding drops in the resources they
have available to invest in their children.169
The result is not a story of broad-based and shared cultural change, as
society as a whole embraces the search for personal fulfillment.  Instead, it is
a story of stark divergences along class, racial, and regional lines in both
norms and behavior, with varying consequences for the interactions between
families and the legal system.170  Starting in the nineties, divorce rates fell for
college graduates.  Indeed, the levels returned back to the levels before the
attitudes or earning capacity. See Andrew J. Cherlin, A Happy Ending to a Half-Century of
Family Change?, 42 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 121, 125 (2016) (observing that lower-income
men tend to have more traditional gender attitudes, making them unlikely to play a house-
husband role, and insufficient earning capacity to play a breadwinner role).
162 McLanahan, supra note 30.
163 Id. at 607.
164 Id.
165 Id. at 608.
166 Id.; see Akerlof et al., supra note 155, at 279.
167 McLanahan, supra note 30, at 612 (emphasis omitted).
168 Id. at 608.
169 Id.
170 See June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, The Triple System of Family Law, 2013 MICH. ST. L.
REV. 1185.
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adoption of no-fault divorce.171  At the same time, however, divorce rates
continued to rise for other parts of the population.172  Between 1982 and
2008, nonmarital birth rates stayed low for white college graduates while ris-
ing for almost everyone else, until they reached approximately forty percent
of the total.173  During the same period, unintended pregnancies fell in half
for better-off women, while increasing dramatically for women below the pov-
erty line.174  During some eras in American history, family developments
move in tandem for much of the American population.  African American
divorce rates, for example, were the same as white rates in 1940.175  And
while college graduates had lower divorce rates than couples with less educa-
tion, the trends moved in the same direction between the seventies and the
nineties.176  Today, however, the story of cultural change has to take into
account increasing class differences, and that requires a different framework
for empirical work in family law.177  Studies that look at divorce, nonmarital
unions, custody determinations, and other family developments risk missing
critical parts of the picture if they look at overall numbers without attention
to changes in norms and behavior that drive different parts of the population
in opposite directions.178
Professor Brinig’s work again offers critical insights about these develop-
ments.  Her results showing that women’s workforce participation does not
increase relationship dissolution fit nicely with the feminist theories that
interpret these trends in terms of a transition to a new gender system, rather
than societal breakdown or individual self-indulgence.179  Yet, the Brinig and
171 Carbone, What Does Bristol Palin Have to Do with Same-Sex Marriage?, supra note 148,
at 319.
172 McLanahan, supra note 30, at 607.
173 See HYMOWITZ ET AL., supra note 30, at 18; NAT’L MARRIAGE PROJECT, THE STATE OF
OUR UNIONS: MARRIAGE IN AMERICA 23 fig.3, 56 (W. Bradford Wilcox et al. eds., 2010),
http://www.virginia.edu/marriageproject/pdfs/Union_11_12_10.pdf; see also MURRAY,
COMING APART, supra note 119, at 159–60 (white nonmarital birth rates), 167 (concentra-
tion by class); Amy Ziettlow & Naomi Cahn, The Honor Commandment: Law, Religion, and the
Challenge of Elder Care, 30 J.L. & RELIGION 229, 236 (2015) (stating that “more than 40% of
children [are] born in nonmarital families”).
174 GUTTMACHER INST., UNINTENDED PREGNANCY IN THE UNITED STATES (2019), https://
www.guttmacher.org/fact-sheet/unintended-pregnancy-united-states; see also Lawrence B.
Finer & Mia R. Zolna, Unintended Pregnancy in the United States: Incidence and Disparities,
2006, 84 CONTRACEPTION 478, 480 (2011).
175 DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, THE NEGRO FAMILY: THE CASE FOR
NATIONAL ACTION 5 (1965), http://www.blackpast.org/?q=primary/moynihan-report-1965.
176 See McLanahan, supra note 30, at 613 fig.4.
177 In contrast, a larger body of research addresses divergences by race, starting with
Wilson’s work in the eighties and nineties.  See, e.g., WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS, supra
note 38.
178 See McLanahan, supra note 30, at 607–08, 612 (showing that divorce rates have been
declining for college graduates at the same time that they are increasing for the rest of the
population).
179 Nock & Brinig, supra note 108, at 186 (finding that women’s increased labor-force
participation does not increase dissolution rates).
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Nock finding that relationship stability suffers when either spouse takes on a
larger share of traditional homemaking does not necessarily lead to a conclu-
sion that the solution for working-class relationships is a less gendered divi-
sion of labor.  Instead, it suggests very different implications.  Societal
inequality—and greater family dysfunction—also rose after the first demo-
graphic transition, with working-class children realizing the benefits of the
new family system only after the unionization movement took hold in the
twentieth century and white blue-collar workers gained access to a “family
wage.”  Brinig’s work implies that the new family terms, whether defined as
the ability to afford a cleaning crew or the ego strength to identify with the
unfairness of the other partner’s assumption of domestic responsibilities,
may simply be beyond the reach of today’s working classes.  This in turn sug-
gests that creation of new working theories of family change must revisit the
mechanics that connect cultural shifts and economic change.  In a retrospec-
tive on the Moynihan report, which attempted to chart changes in the Afri-
can American family in the mid-1960s, it was the sociologists who argued for a
renewed focus on economics.  They wrote that the much-vilified Moynihan
report’s “core argument was really rather simple: whenever males in any pop-
ulation subgroup lack widespread access to reliable jobs, decent earnings,
and key forms of socially rewarded status, single parenthood will increase,
with negative side effects on women and children.”180
In other words, economic shifts and cultural change are intrinsically
interrelated.  So long as the economic and sociological literatures talk past
each other, empirical family law will lack the robust discourse necessary to
give meaning to the findings.  The solution is to address the ways that such a
discourse might be created within family law even if they do not already exist
in the social sciences.  And that requires that family law scholars become
more informed consumers of empirical analysis.
IV. A CONSUMER’S GUIDE TO THE NEXT GENERATION OF
EMPIRICAL WORK IN FAMILY LAW
The challenge for the next generation of empirical work in family law
will be to create legal discourses that include, inform, and learn from empiri-
cal analysis.  These discourses should complement those in the social sci-
ences, but they should also not be limited by them.  Creation of these
discourses needs to pay particular attention to three factors, in particular: the
need to create a distinctly legal empirical discourse; the integration of eco-
nomic and cultural changes into that discourse; and attention to the intersec-
tion of class, race, and regional differences in the creation of new databases
and in the interpretation of family decisionmaking.
180 See Douglas S. Massey & Robert J. Sampson, Moynihan Redux: Legacies and Lessons,
621 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 6, 13 (2009).
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A. Creating a Distinctly Legal Empirical Discourse in Family Law
Family law includes a number of canonical works that emphasize the way
that the impact of the law on family decisionmaking extends well beyond
statutory provisions and judicial decisions.  These works include Mnookin
and Kornhauser’s Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce,181
which argued that divorce negotiations constitute a form of “private order-
ing” that allows couples to create their own legally enforceable commitments
that may differ in significant ways from formal adjudications.182  The dis-
course extends further to Schneider’s The Channelling Function in Family Law,
which maintains that “the law recruits, builds, shapes, sustains, and promotes
social institutions.”183  Schneider argues that this “channelling function”
operates through the individual’s internationalization of shared societal obli-
gations rather than through more coercive legal means.184  The discussion of
how law affects family decisionmaking also builds on the lengthy and well-
established legal literature depicting a “dual system of family law.”185  This
literature acknowledges the traditional “first system,” which Mnookin and
Kornhauser describe, that is governed by the laws of marriage and divorce
and the formal contracts between the parties.186  It also critiques a “second
system,” governed by the public law that addresses eligibility for government
benefits, and argues that this second system often imposes involuntary obliga-
tions on poorer families at odds with the parties’ own understanding of their
relationships.187  Taken together, these works create a robust framework for
thinking of the law as an iterative process that contributes to establishing
understood norms and moral obligations, but sometimes with different con-
sequences for different groups of people.188
Professor Brinig’s empirical work has contributed to and enriched this
tradition.  Her work on engagement rings, for example, explored how the
engagement ring custom arose during a time period when state legislatures
were abolishing legal redress for breach of the promise to marry, and the
rings acted as an informal form of “liquidated damages” or insurance for
breach.189  Her work on custody has influenced the way that Naomi Cahn
and I view decisions not to marry.  Building on Professor Brinig’s work, we
181 Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The
Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).
182 Id. at 950–52.
183 Carl E. Schneider, The Channelling Function in Family Law, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 495,
496 (1992).
184 Id. at 503–04, 506, 530 (contrasting more coercive legal systems, such as the crimi-
nal law, with family law’s channeling function).
185 See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
186 See tenBroek, supra note 36.
187 See, e.g., Hasday, supra note 36, at 306 n.14, 368–71; Hatcher, supra note 36, at
1043–44.
188 See Scott & Scott, supra note 12, at 340 (contrasting norm creation within institu-
tions with more varied norms outside of institutions like marriage).
189 See Brinig, supra note 152.
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have argued that there is a “third system of family law,” one defined in terms
of couples who order the terms of their relationships by avoiding contact
with the first two systems.  The prototypical example of such a system involves
couples who have children together without marriage and without seeking
public benefits for the children.190
Seeing decisions to marry in their legal context can change the interpre-
tations of empirical work on nonmarital unions.  Naomi Cahn and I have
argued, for example, that the shift in women’s roles from intrinsically depen-
dent to potentially independent has remade the understandings of what mar-
riage is about both legally and practically.  These shifts then inform in turn
decisions not to marry, and the norms that govern nonmarital relation-
ships.191  Three changes, in particular, influence the results.  First, marriage
has changed from a hierarchical and dependent relationship to a more egali-
tarian and interdependent one.192  This means that high-earning partners
who do not wish to share their assets equally with their lower-earning part-
ners,193 and legal parents who do not wish to grant their partners equal
parental status may simply opt out of marriage, thereby enjoying legal default
rules that do not impose equal or reciprocal obligations on the parties.194
Second, unmarried obligations may involve a different allocation of deci-
sionmaking power.  As Brinig and Allen indicated, women are more likely to
initiate divorce, and their custody laws influence their decisions to do so.195
Changing state laws, however, have placed increasing emphasis on shared
parenting, routinely entering divorce decrees that give both parents a contin-
uing role in their children’s lives.196  If parents do not marry, on the other
hand, relationships typically end when the father moves out.  If the father
then wants custodial rights, he must either enlist the mother’s cooperation,
or he bears the burden of going to court and securing a custodial order.
Empirical studies indicate that unmarried fathers are dramatically less likely
than married fathers to obtain such orders.197  Some scholars have criticized
190 See Carbone & Cahn, supra note 170.
191 See generally Carbone & Cahn, supra note 157 (describing how married and unmar-
ried relationships differ).
192 Id. at 84 (describing marriage as a system premised on equality and
interdependence).
193 Id. at 100 (describing decisions not to marry as often following from a lack of trust
or commitment).
194 See PATRICIA BROWN & STEVEN T. COOK, INST. FOR RESEARCH ON POVERTY, UNIV. OF
WIS.-MADISON, CHILDREN’S PLACEMENT ARRANGEMENTS IN DIVORCE AND PATERNITY CASES IN
WISCONSIN 9–12, 18–21 (2012), https://www.irp.wisc.edu/wp/wp-content/uploads/2018/
06/Task4A_CS_09-11_Final_revi2012.pdf (showing that unmarried fathers are much less
likely than married fathers to have parenting orders).
195 Brinig & Allen, supra note 101, at 156–58 (indicating that women are more likely to
file for divorce).
196 See Margaret F. Brinig, Penalty Defaults in Family Law: The Case of Child Custody, 33
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 779, 781–82 (2006) (discussing movement toward equalizing custodial
rights at divorce).
197 See BROWN & COOK, supra note 194, at 9–12, 18–21.
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these results as mothers’ “gatekeeping,” but the mothers’ primary role is con-
sistent with working-class (though not upper-middle-class) norms.198
In a similar fashion, higher-earning partners, who tend overwhelmingly
to be men, gain greater control over their separate resources by not mar-
rying.  These partners may be similar to the married men who initiate divorce
after long-term relationships (i.e., relatively well-off men paired with lower-
earning partners), but they may also include older couples entering into new
relationships who wish to preserve their assets for their children from earlier
relationships.199  Higher-earning partners’ ability to maintain relationships
outside of marriage enhances their bargaining power both within these
unions and at the time of dissolution.200  Important empirical questions
involve how large these various groups are, and the degree to which a legal
regime designed to benefit one group disadvantages others.
Third, staying out of marriage increases the ability of the couple to set
their own terms for their relationships.  For unmarried parents, these terms
involve the ability to trade custody and support.  As Leslie Harris argues,
couples who succeed in staying out of court are more likely to combine
father involvement and paternal support in their children’s lives than
couples who litigate—or who have support terms imposed by the state.201
Cynthia Bowman argues as well that part of the motivation for unmarried
couples who choose to live apart is the desire to retain greater control over
each partner’s independent life; these couples share their intimate lives, but
not necessarily their housekeeping and financial responsibilities.202  The
ability to negotiate individual solutions may be particularly important in com-
munities that do not share mainstream norms, but they may also motivate
those who wish to flout them, such as higher-earning partners who reject the
obligation to care for dependent partners.203
Considering these factors makes nonmarriage—and the third system of
family law—not just a matter of cultural expression, but an alternative legal
regime that orders family obligations in a different manner from the formal
law of marriage or parentage.  It deserves to be a subject of discourse—and
empirical research—on terms of its own.
198 See, e.g., KATHRYN EDIN & TIMOTHY J. NELSON, DOING THE BEST I CAN: FATHERHOOD
IN THE INNER CITY 214 (2013) (describing mothers as acting as gatekeepers in accordance
with legal and community norms); Huntington, supra note 13, at 173 (criticizing gatekeep-
ing and favoring greater emphasis on shared custody for unmarried couples).
199 See Brinig & Allen, supra note 101, at 135–36.
200 See generally Albertina Antognini, Nonmarital Coverture, 99 B.U. L. REV. 2139 (2019)
(arguing that nonmarital relationships today replicate the disadvantages associated with
coverture in that domestic contributions outside of marriage are not recognized or
valued).
201 See Harris, supra note 14, at 165–66.
202 See, e.g., Cynthia Grant Bowman, How Should the Law Treat Couples Who Live Apart
Together?, 29 CHILD & FAM. L.Q 335, 335–36 (2018).
203 See Antognini, supra note 200, at 2148–49 (describing the failure to protect lower-
earning partners who contribute services).
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B. Reintegrating Economics and Culture
Changing family norms may be seen to reflect long term economic
changes without being reduced to self-interested financial calculations.  Con-
necting economic with sociological analysis, in turn, requires taking seriously
the evolution of family law and policy in terms of the growing class divisions
in American life.  This means recasting the debate in new terms, letting go of
the older law-and-economics debate and limiting the SDT discourse to its
more limited demographic terms.  Instead, integrating the two discourses
means more realistic analyses of the growing class divide in American family
life.  Such an analysis might focus on the following issues:
First, growing inequality increasingly separates the top of the income
scale not just from the bottom, but also from the middle, complicating dis-
cussions about the role of marriage and gender.  At the top of the economy,
couples overwhelmingly do marry, and both dual-earner and single-earner
relationships tend to endure.204  Nonetheless, the increasing hours for the
most competitive positions in the economy, together with the enormous
compensation packages available to the winners in these competitions,
increasingly make elite families look more traditional than simply well off
ones.205  These families, however, do not simply replicate historical patterns
of Becker-type “specialization.”  At one time, those who worked long hours
made less per hour than those who worked less.  Today, the payoff per hour
for top earners has increased dramatically, making it much more difficult to
sustain two-full-time-earner families with children at this level.206  In addi-
tion, there is intriguing evidence that employers, particularly large law firms,
may discriminate against professional women from upper-income back-
grounds in favor of women from working-class origins because the working
class women do not have the same the opportunities to marry well and may
therefore focus more intently on their careers even after having children.207
All of this suggests that the emerging family paradigms for those at the top of
the socioeconomic spectrum may not be the same as (and may not have the
same meaning even when they look similar to) the emerging models at other
economic levels.
Second, empirical research about the disappearance of marriage at the
bottom of the socioeconomic scale still fails to effectively model the interac-
tion between disappearing male employment and relationship stability.  After
a half century, there is finally growing acceptance that the Moynihan report
identified a far-reaching issue: the increasing lack of “key forms of socially
rewarded status” for blue collar men.208  Andrew Cherlin’s 2014 book,
Labor’s Love Lost: The Rise and Fall of the Working-Class Family in America, has
204 See AMATO ET AL., supra note 85.
205 See, e.g., Miller, supra note 64.
206 Id.
207 Lauren Rivera & András Tilcsik, Research: How Subtle Class Cues Can Backfire on Your
Resume, HARV. BUS. REV. (Dec. 21, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/12/research-how-subtle-
class-cues-can-backfire-on-your-resume.
208 Massey & Sampson, supra note 39, at 13.
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helped to refocus sociological attention on the connection between the loss
of stable, good-paying jobs for working-class men and family dissolution.209
Still, research is badly lacking on the precise mechanisms that connect
employment and family stability.  While European feminists have argued that
male failure to help out more within the household undermines relationship
stability, masculinities theory suggests that male behavior and attractiveness
involve not just employment or income per se, but socially rewarded sta-
tus.210  Both men and women continue to view male status in terms of rela-
tively traditional measures such as income and employment.211  The loss of
status-conferring male employment may accordingly undermine both tradi-
tional male contributions to the family and male willingness to assume more
traditionally female tasks, at least to the extent that these tasks are associated
with lower societal status.212  In addition, the loss of male employment often
correlates with not just lower income, but changes in behavior including inti-
mate-partner violence and substance abuse.213  Understanding what is taking
place within the family is not a matter of changing male or female roles con-
sidered in isolation, but rather involve complex questions about how they
interact.214
Missing from the economic studies, moreover, is consideration of how
income stability, as opposed to unemployment or low income, affects rela-
tionship dissolution.  Employment stability has declined steadily over the last
209 ANDREW J. CHERLIN, LABOR’S LOVE LOST: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE WORKING-CLASS
FAMILY IN AMERICA (2014).
210 See id.; see also RICHARD WILKINSON & KATE PICKETT, THE SPIRIT LEVEL: WHY GREATER
EQUALITY MAKES SOCIETIES STRONGER (2009) (suggesting that relative levels of inequality as
well as loss of jobs may influence behavior).
211 See, e.g., Kristen Harknett & Arielle Kuperberg, Education, Labor Markets, and the
Retreat from Marriage, 90 SOC. FORCES 41 (2011); Liana C. Sayer, et al., She Left, He Left: How
Employment and Satisfaction Affect Men’s and Women’s Decisions to Leave Marriages, 116 AM. J.
SOC. 6 (2011) (finding that male, but not female, employment affects marriage and
divorce rates).
212 See Nock & Brinig, supra note 108, at 186; see also NANCY E. DOWD, THE MAN QUES-
TION: MALE SUBORDINATION AND PRIVILEGE 13–73, 105–23 (2010); Nancy E. Dowd, Asking
the Man Question: Masculinities Analysis and Feminist Theory, 33 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 415, 420
(2010); Nancy E. Dowd, Masculinities and Feminist Legal Theory, 23 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y
201, 239 (2008); Daniel Schneider, Market Earnings and Household Work: New Tests of Gender
Performance Theory, 73 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 845 (2011).
213 See, e.g., Clifford L. Broman et al., The Impact of Unemployment on Families, MICH. FAM.
REV., Winter 1996, at 83 (describing impact of unemployment on family dynamics); Tony
Dokoupil, Lifestyle: Laid-Off Men Don’t Do Dishes, NEWSWEEK (Feb. 20, 2009), http://www
.newsweek.com/2009/02/20/men-will-be-men.html (describing impact of unemployment
on male behavior).
214 In Marriage Markets, Naomi Cahn and I argued that a major factor in that interac-
tion was gender ratios—that is, the extent to which men outearn women in a given rela-
tionship market. CARBONE & CAHN, supra note 32.  Since then, a new study has shown that
the degree to which men outearn women in a given area predicts marriage rates. See Mari-
anne Bertrand et al., Gender Identity and Relative Income Within Households, 130 Q.J. ECON.
571 (2015).
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several decades for blue-collar men.215  Standard economic theory suggests
that firms with variable income require greater capital reserves than firms
with more stable revenue.216  Committed relationships typically involve inter-
mingled finances and the couples’ mutual commitment to each other to see
their partners through bad times.217  Yet, thirty-nine percent of Americans
have reported that they would have difficulty covering a $400 emergency
expense; most would have to resort to borrowing.218  For middle-class
couples, dual incomes provide a cushion that helps the family weather one
partner’s loss of a job or reduction in income.  In poor families, a commit-
ment to take care of the partner may come out of the resources a parent sees
as necessary to clothe, feed, and educate the children.  An automobile acci-
dent, hospital stay, mounting fines from unpaid traffic tickets, or job loss can
quickly wipe out a family’s entire savings.  In these circumstances, it is hardly
surprising that working-class couples may want economic stability, including
home ownership, paying off student debts, and secure transportation before
they enter into a binding economic commitment like marriage.219  Yet, rela-
tively few studies explore the impact of income instability on relationship
duration.220  The norms that may be evolving to address the lack of eco-
nomic security may provide important feedback loops into the understand-
ing of relationship terms.
215 See CARBONE & CAHN, supra note 32, at 97–101 (describing impact of male employ-
ment instability on relationships); Henry S. Farber, Job Loss and the Decline in Job Security in
the United States, in LABOR IN THE NEW ECONOMY 223, 255 (Katharine G. Abraham et al. eds.,
2010) (showing that “[r]ates of job loss are inversely related to education”).
216 See, e.g., Troy Adkins, Optimal Use of Financial Leverage in a Corporate Capital Structure,
INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/111813/optimal-use-
financial-leverage-corporate-capital-structure.asp (last updated Apr. 4, 2019) (stating that
“a company that exhibits high and relatively stable sales activity is in a better position to
utilize financial leverage, as compared to a company that has lower and more volatile
sales”).
217 See Fenaba R. Addo & Sharon Sassler, Financial Arrangements and Relationship Quality
in Low-Income Couples, 59 FAM. REL. 408, 411 (2010) (finding that married couples are more
likely than unmarried couples to pool income).
218 BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., REPORT ON THE ECONOMIC WELL-BEING
OF U.S. HOUSEHOLDS IN 2018, at 2 (2019).
219 CHERLIN, supra note 27, at 140–41.
220 See, e.g., Healthy Relationships and Financial Stability—Project Page, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH
& HUM. SERVS. (Jan. 22, 2009), https://aspe.hhs.gov/healthy-relationships-and-financial-
stability-project-page (observing that “[f]inancial hardship and instability can foster con-
flict and seriously impact the stability of a couples [sic] relationship as well as their
finances, especially when there are no rainy-day funds and little knowledge of where to
turn for help”); Heather D. Hill et al., An Introduction to Household Economic Instability and
Social Policy, 91 SOC. SERV. REV. 371 (2017) (identifying work in the social sciences focusing
on the impact of economic instability, but with limited examination of the impact on fam-
ily instability as opposed to the impact of family instability on economic security); Alexan-
dra Killewald, Money, Work, and Marital Stability: Assessing Change in the Gendered Determinants
of Divorce, 81 AM. SOC. REV. 696, 696 (2016) (finding that male unemployment, but not
female unemployment or income declines, correlates with higher divorce rates).
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Third, empirical work on repartnering is beginning to change our
understanding of family dynamics.  Cherlin reports, for example, that white
women with a high school but not a college degree have a larger number of
cohabiting partners than any other group.221  These relationships often
involve marriage, divorce, and then repartnering, and the patterns make
determinations of parental responsibility more difficult.  Naomi Cahn and I
have argued that an increasing number of states recognize more than two
adults playing parental roles, but family law has yet to determine whether
gamete donors, stepparents, and other live-in partners should all be
accorded the same status.222  The meaning of these relationships may well
differ in different communities.  Sociological research does emphasize the
role of multipartner fertility in undermining family stability and children’s
well-being.  That research, however, has yet to be fully integrated into the
legal issues surrounding parentage and custody, which remains overwhelm-
ingly tied to a two-parent model.
C. Identifying Partnerships That Should Not Last
Finally, a new body of empirical work is changing our understanding of
the poorest families, through the creation of new databases that capture rela-
tionships that may exist outside of formal legal statuses.223  Sara McLana-
han’s work on fragile families initially changed our images of unmarried
families.  By following unmarried women from the time they gave birth,
McLanahan showed the changing nature of these families.  While at one
time, most unmarried mothers raised children without the fathers’ involve-
ment, McLanahan showed that in fact the majority of unmarried mothers
were in an intimate relationship with the fathers at the time of the child’s
birth, and the majority of the fathers remained involved in the child’s life,
though the relationships did not typically last.224
221 Andrew J. Cherlin, Between Poor and Prosperous: Do the Family Patterns of Moderately
Educated Americans Deserve a Closer Look?, in SOCIAL CLASS AND CHANGING FAMILIES IN AN
UNEQUAL AMERICA 68, 82 (Marcia J. Carlson & Paula England eds., 2011).
222 See generally June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Parents, Babies, and More Parents, 92 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 9 (2017) (arguing that there is increasing pressure to recognize more than
two parents without agreement on whether all adults playing parental roles should be
accorded equal status).
223 See Margaret F. Brinig, Racial and Gender Justice in the Child Welfare and Child Support
Systems, 35 LAW & INEQ. 199, 199–200 (2017) (observing that it has been more difficult for
empiricists to study unmarried relationships and that “[a] problem from a data perspective
is that [in unmarried relationships] the separations themselves do not require a legal pro-
cess before a new relationship begins, and that even where the legal system does get
involved, any records are likely to be confidential” (footnote omitted)).
224 See Sharon H. Bzostek et al., Mothers’ Repartnering After a Nonmarital Birth, 90 SOC.
FORCES 817, 826 (2012) (“At the time of the child’s birth, slightly over half of all unmarried
mothers were living with the child’s father, around 30 percent were dating the child’s
father, and just under one-fifth were not romantically involved with the child’s father.  Five
years later, 38 percent of mothers were living with the focal child’s father (about 55 per-
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Today, Professor Jennifer Barber of Michigan is creating a new database
tracking the trajectories of young women before they bear children.  Her
work, which involves tracking a large group of young women in Flint, Michi-
gan, through the creation of weekly diaries, is shedding new light on why
women become pregnant, showing, for example, that intimate-partner vio-
lence plays a significant role in the pregnancies, and that the characteristics
of the male partners, rather than the women’s characteristics, is a major fac-
tor in determining which women will become pregnant.225  This work, in
turn, suggests that the circumstances of the pregnancies, which include pat-
terns of contraceptive use influenced by the incidence of violence, may affect
relationship trajectories, with the more violent men both being more likely to
father children and less likely to be good bets for continuing involvement
with the resulting children than less violent partners.226
Professor Brinig’s recent work intersects with Barber’s as she has relied
on court records to create a more detailed picture of families involved in
child support and custody litigation.  While much of her work validates ear-
lier findings about the relationship between visitation and support, her most
disturbing findings concern the role of domestic violence.227  Intimate-part-
ner violence allegations, which disproportionally occur in cases involving
poorer, unmarried parents, make it more difficult for parents to resolve dis-
putes on their own, and the courts end up second guessing parental deci-
sions to limit contact between the nonresidential parent and the child.228
Brinig observes that the results in these cases contrast with those involving
better-off couples, who enjoy more control over decisions to bring or con-
tinue litigation.229  These findings complement other work that shows that
custodial parents without child support orders overwhelmingly chose not to
seek formal orders, either because they were already receiving support within
a cooperative relationship or because they did not want ongoing contact with
the other parent.230
cent of those who were cohabiting at birth still lived together), and just over 30 percent
were romantically involved with a new partner . . . .”).
225 See Jennifer S. Barber et al., The Relationship Context of Young Pregnancies, 35 LAW &
INEQ. 175 (2017) [hereinafter Barber, The Relationship Context]; Jennifer S. Barber et al.,
The Dynamics of Intimate Partner Violence and the Risk of Pregnancy During the Transition to
Adulthood, 83 AM. SOC. REV. 1020 (2018); Yasamin Kusunoki et al., Black-White Differences in
Sex and Contraceptive Use Among Young Women, 53 DEMOGRAPHY 1399, 1403 (2016) (stating
that low-income women are more likely to experience intimate-partner violence).
226 See Barber, The Relationship Context, supra note 225.
227 Margaret F. Brinig, Chickens and Eggs: Does Custody Move Support, or Vice-Versa?, 29 J.
AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 269, 295 (2017). See generally Margaret F. Brinig & Marsha Garri-
son, Invisible Prison: Pathways and Prevention, 95 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1439 (2020).
228 Brinig, supra note 227, at 295.
229 See id.
230 See, e.g., TIMOTHY S. GRALL, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, CUSTODIAL MOTHERS AND
FATHERS AND THEIR CHILD SUPPORT: 2009 (2011); Esther Wattenberg, Paternity Actions and
Young Fathers, in YOUNG UNWED FATHERS: CHANGING ROLES AND EMERGING POLICIES 213,
221, 226–27 (Robert I. Lerman & Theodora J. Ooms eds., 1993).
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In a second piece, Brinig uses court records to comment on the relation-
ship findings in Barber’s work.231  She finds an incidence of postpaternity
domestic violence comparable to the levels of violence in Barber’s study, but
finds further that the violence correlates with child support enforcement,
and to racial differences between the parents, particularly where “the mother
was White and the father Black or Hispanic.”232
Taken together, studies like McLanahan’s, Barber’s and Brinig’s are
beginning to present a new portrait of relationship decisions and parenting.
They address what has been a critical missing piece in the empirical study of
family: the assembly of detailed databases making it possible to study less
traditional families.  These new databases may then create new discourses
shaped by the nature of the empirical findings themselves rather than the
imposition of theoretical models that do not reflect the empirical results.233
The results offer a model for a new, more productive era of family law
research.
CONCLUSION
Empirical research in family law has been most productive when it does
not just provide findings but influences the collection of data and the nature
of the questions asked.  The interpretation of the results that emerge then
depends on the sophistication of the discourse in which the interpretation is
embedded.
Today’s families—and their intersection with the legal system—have
become more diverse, complicating the mechanics and the interpretations of
empirical work.  Professor Brinig, throughout her career, has contributed to
construction of more robust data, the integration of economic and legal anal-
ysis, and the resistance to the excessively reductionist analysis associated with
the early economic analysis of the family.  Her work provides a model for
empiricists, as it appropriately complicates consideration of the role of race,
class, gender, and violence in the construction and interpretation of family
law findings.  The result has enriched the discourses that take empirical work
seriously and points the way to more productive future research.
231 Brinig, supra note 223, at 214–15.
232 Id. at 215.
233 See also Bowman, supra note 202, whose empirical work on “living apart together”
has brought attention to an otherwise invisible group.
